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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is vested in the Utah Supreme Court under Article
VIII/ Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah and Rule 58A of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Did the lower court err in finding that U.S. Capital's

August 22, 1989 check was given to Warner Nissan to "cover the cost
of the vehicle."
2.

(R. at 140).

Did the lower court err in finding that "U.S. Capital

paid for the cost of [sic] 1989 Nissan Sentra with its check."

(R.

at 140).
3.

Did the lower court err in finding that "U.S. Capital

Corp. was negotiating to acquire Eagle Auto Leasing or one of its
affiliates and U.S. Capital Corp.'s interest in Eagle Auto Leasing
was

further

consideration

plaintiff by U.S. Capital."
4.

for the

issuance of the check to

(R. at 140).

Did the lower court err in finding that "plaintiff has

been damaged by U.S. Capital's issuance of its bad check."

(R. at

141) .
5.

Did the lower court err in holding that §7-15-1 of the

Utah Code Annotated applies in this case.
6.

(R. at 142).

Did the lower court err in finding and holding that

adequate consideration was given by plaintiff to U.S. Capital for
its check.
7.

(R. at 142).

Did the lower court err in holding that U.S. Capital was

liable to Warner Nissan in the amount of the dishonored check. (R.
at 142).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The

determinative

statute

is

§7-15-1

of

the

Utah

Code

Annotated•
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF CASE:
Plaintiff in the lower Court brought an action to collect a

dishonored check given to it by U.S. Capital as a favor to a third
party, Eagle Auto Leasing.

Claims were asserted based on the

Dishonored Instrument statute and as principles of contract law to
recover the full amount of the check.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS:
This matter was tried to the Court on July 11, 1990.

The

Court entered its Bench Ruling upon completion of the trial, and
Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on
September 5, 1990. Notice of Appeal was filed October 4, 1990.
C.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL:
At the July 16, 1990 trial, the Court found in favor of the

plaintiff

under

both

the

Dishonored

Instrument

statute

and

principles of contract law for the full amount of the face of the
check and for costs and attorneys fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is a civil action brought by Warner Nissan for the
purpose of collecting on a check which was given to it as a favor
by U.S. Capital for Eagle Auto Leasing to cover an existing debt
created by the sale of a car by Warner Nissan to Eagle Auto

2

Leasing.

Critical to understanding the facts of this case is to

understand that it is comprised of two distinct transactions.
A.

FIRST TRANSACTION: THE SALE OF THE CAR TO EAGLE AUTO LEASING.
Eagle Auto Leasing, is a Utah corporation which in July of

1989 was involved in the retail sale and leasing of automobiles.
(R. 159, at pp. 69, 81). On or about July 3, 1989, Warner Nissan
sold a 1989 Nissan Sentra to Eagle Auto Leasing.

(R. 159, at pp.

8, 9, 46, 55). The Vehicle Buyer's Order & Purchase Agreement was
signed by Eagle Auto Leasing.
4).

(R. 159, at p. 20, see also Exhibit

It was understood that the sale of the 1989 Nissan Sentra to

Eagle Auto Leasing was for the purpose of immediate resale to Karen
Stoker, the retail consumer of the automobile. Eagle Auto Leasing
did not have any special business relationship with Warner Nissan,
and purchased automobiles at the same price as any other retail
purchaser (R. 159 at p. 45-6).

(R. 159, at p. 9).

For the

purposes of the sale, however, the transfer of the automobile was
from Warner Nissan to Eagle Auto Leasing, no other individuals or
entities were involved in that transaction.

(R. 159, at p. 36,

55).
The transaction between Warner Nissan and Eagle Auto Leasing
involved the delivery of the automobile (R. 159, at pp. 21, 35, 47)
and the working out of arrangements for payment of the agreed upon
price.

(R. 159, at p. 22). The automobile was delivered on July

3, 1989, and a check in the agreed upon price of $10,043.50, dated
July 3, 1989, was given to Warner Nissan.

Eagle Auto Leasing

requested as part of the terms of the sale that the check be held
3

for seven to ten days so funds could be made available to pay the
check. (R. 159, at pp. 22, 42, 48). In a separate transaction, the
automobile was sold by Eagle Auto Leasing to Karen Stoker.

The

sale of the automobile by Warner Nissan to Eagle Auto Leasing was
completed with the delivery of the vehicle and the creation of the
debt obligation to be paid in the future.

(R. 159, at pp. 36-7).

When the debt created proved difficult to collect, Warner
Nissan never threatened to repossess the car, something they
acknowledged they could not do, (R. 159, at p. 34-40) nor did it
pursue any other form of collection other than requesting payment
from Eagle Auto Leasing.
B.

(R. 159, at pp. 38-40, 73-5, 86).

SECOND TRANSACTION: DISCHARGE OF DEBT CREATED BY THE FIRST
TRANSACTION.
The check dated July 3, 1989 was held as agreed and was

finally deposited for payment on July 18, 1989.

(R. 157, at p.

48). That check was subsequently returned to Warner Nissan stamped
"RTM" "refer to maker".

(R. 159, at p. 10-11).

Thereafter, a

replacement check was issued by Eagle Auto Leasing on the 27th day
of July, 1989, which was given to Warner Nissan.
49).

(R. 159, at p.

That check was returned marked "Account Closed."

(R. 159,

Exhibit 2).
On or about August 22, 1989, Eagle Auto Leasing approached
U.S. Capital asking as a favor for U.S. Capital to tender a check
to Warner Nissan in the amount of $10,143.50 to cover a debt
created by the sale of the car from Warner Nissan to Eagle Auto
Leasing.

(R. 159, at pp. 58, 80).

The president of Eagle Auto

Leasing, Pat Brody, told Ron Hansen, an officer of U.S. Capital,
4

that Warner Nissan would not accept any more checks from Eagle Auto
Leasing so he needed as a favor to have U.S. Capital provide a
check drawn on U.S. Capital's account to Warner Nissan. JEdL Eagle
Auto Leasing stated that it would cover the U.S. Capital check that
afternoon or the next day.

(R. 159 at pp. 59-60).

Prior to August

22, 1989, U. S. Capital and Warner Nissan had had no prior dealings
with each other, (R. 157, at pp. 36-37) and U. S. Capital knew
nothing about the transaction that created the $10,043.00 debt.
(R. 159, at p. 61).
On or about August 22, 1989, U.S. Capital delivered a check in
the amount of $10,143.50 to Warner Nissan to cover the debt
obligation of Eagle Auto Leasing to Warner Nissan.
pp. 19, 40, 79).

(R. at 159, at

With the delivery of the check, U.S. Capital

received nothing from Warner Nissan, or any other party, for the
delivery of the check.

(R. 159, at pp. 41, 71, 76, 86). U.S.

Capital never took possession of or acquired any interest in the
car, never used the car and in fact never saw the car.

(R. 159, at

p. 85-6).
When Eagle Auto Leasing failed to provide funds to cover U.S.
Capital's check, U.S. Capital issued a stop order against the check
paid to Warner Nissan.
C.

(R. 159, at pp. 76-77).

RELATIONSHIP OF THE VARIOUS ENTITIES TO THE TRANSACTIONS.
Warner Nissan was the seller of the 1989 Nissan Sentra

automobile (R. 159, at p. 8-9).
Eagle Auto Leasing, a Utah corporation, was the purchaser of
the 1989 Nissan Sentra (R. 159, at p. 20).
5

Eagle

In-House

Services, is

distinct from Eagle Auto Leasing.

a

corporation

separate and

(R. 159, at p. 57). Eagle In-

House Services was not a party to any transaction in this case.
(R. 159, at p. 36, 55).
U.S. Capital, a closely held corporation, as a favor to Eagle
Auto Leasing, provided a check to Warner Nissan.
80).

(R. 159, at p.

U.S. Capital never purchased any vehicle from Warner Nissan.

(R. 159, at p. 58). U.S. Capital had no relationship, contractual
or otherwise, with Eagle Auto Leasing (R. 159, at p. 79, 83), and
was not involved in negotiations to acquire Eagle Auto Leasing.
(R. 159, at p. 83-4).
VIP Leasing has been mentioned in this case, but it is a misidentification of VIP*Comlink.

(R. 159, at p. 57).

Karen Stoker purchased the 1989 Nissan Sentra from Eagle Auto
Leasing a took possession of the vehicle.

(R. 159, at p. 9).

Karen Stoker had no contact or affiliation with U.S. Capital or
VIP*Comlink.

(R. 159, at p. 28).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This appeal raises issues concerning the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting certain Findings of Fact made by the Trial
Court,

and

also

raises

substantial

questions

concerning

the

application of §7-15-1 (the Dishonored Instruments statute) of the
Utah Code Annotated, the adequacy of consideration given for U.S.
Capital's check.

6

A.

THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN MAKING CERTAIN CRITICAL
FINDINGS OF FACT.
There is insufficient

evidence to support the following

Findings of Fact made by the Trial Court:
(1)

The August 22, 1989 check of U.S. Capital was given to

"cover the cost of the vehicle";
(2)

U.S. Capital "paid for the cost of [sic] 1989 Nissan

Sentra with its check";
(3)

"U.S. Capital Corp. was negotiating to acquire Eagle Auto

Leasing or one of its affiliates and U.S. Capital's interest in
Eagle Auto Leasing was further consideration for the issuance of
the check to plaintiff by U.S. Capital";
(4) Plaintiff has been "damaged by U.S. Capital's issuance of
its bad check".
B.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF LAW.
The lower Court erred in its application of law by applying

§7-15-1 of the Utah Code Annotated
generally

accepted

principles

to this case, and under

of contract

law, there was no

consideration for the check that was given by U.S. Capital to
Warner Nissan to support a claim for damages.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
The issues addressed in this appeal relate to the sufficiency
of evidence to support the court's Findings of Fact, and relate to
questions of the Court's application of the Dishonored Instrument
statute to this case and holding that sufficient consideration was
given to support a claim against U.S. Capital.
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A.

THE LOWER COURT CLEARLY ERRED IN MAKING CERTAIN FINDINGS OF
FACT SINCE THEY ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF
THE EVIDENCE.
The applicable

standard

for reviewing

the Trial Court's

Findings of Fact is that if the Trial Court's findings are so
lacking in support as to be "against a clear weight of evidence",
or "clearly erroneous" those findings will be rejected.

In re:

Estate of Bartell, 776 P. 2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989), see also Scharf
v. BMG Corp., 700 P. 2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

In this instance,

the Trial Court made certain Findings of Fact that are not
supported by the clear weight of evidence, and should be reversed.
(1) THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE AUGUST 22, 1989
CHECK WAS GIVEN TO "COVER THE COST OF THE VEHICLE".
Factually, it is essential to recognize that there were two
separate

transactions

distinction

involved

in

this

case.

That

factual

is essential to understanding the actions of the

parties and one which the Trial Court failed to perceive. Because
the Trial Court failed to understand that distinction, the Trial
Court erroneously made the Finding of Fact that the August 22, 1989
check was given to "cover the cost" of the vehicle purchased by
Eagle Auto Leasing and later sold to Karen Stoker.
The record before the Trial Court reflects the following
undisputed set of facts:

A 1989 red Nissan Sentra was sold by

Warner Nissan to Eagle Auto Leasing for ultimate sale to Karen
Stoker. The initial sale was accomplished on July 3, 1989 with the
delivery of the automobile and arrangements by contract for payment
to be made available later to cover the check delivered July 3,
1989 • The only parties to that transaction were Eagle Auto Leasing
8

and Warner Nissan.

The check was held to permit funds to be made

available to pay the check.

It is undisputed that the sale of the

Nissan Sentra was completed on July 3, 1989. U.S. Capital was not
involved

with

that

transaction.

All

that

remained

of

the

transaction after July 3, 1989 was a debt obligation owed by Eagle
Auto Leasing to Warner Nissan and to be collected from the July 3f
1989 check.
When the car was delivered for the agreed price a debt
obligation was created from Eagle Auto Leasing to Warner Nissan,
which Warner Nissan thereafter tried to collect. After the July 3,
1989 check from Eagle Auto Leasing did not clear the bank, a second
check was given to Warner Nissan by Eagle Auto Leasing on July 27,
1989.

It also was returned uncollected.

Warner Nissan was aware that the car was to be resold to Karen
Stoker, and it also knew that it could not rescind the sale of the
vehicle or pursue repossession because the car was no longer in the
hands of Eagle Auto Leasing.

Its only recourse was to pursue

collection of the debt obligation from Eagle Auto Leasing.
By August 22, 1989, when U.S. Capital provided its check to
Warner Nissan as a favor to Eagle Auto Leasing, U.S. Capital and
Warner Nissan understood that the check was being provided to clear
up problems created by the dishonored instruments, and that U.S.
Capital would not receive the automobile or any interest in it.
The check delivered to Warner Nissan by U.S. Capital contained, at
Eagle Auto

Leasing's

direction, an

9

extra

$100.00 which

was

understood to be a bonus for inconvenience created by the dishonor
of the prior two checks tendered by Eagle Auto Leasing.
From the record, there is nothing to indicate or support a
finding that the August 22, 1989 check was given to "cover the cost
of the vehicle".

The transaction involving the vehicle was

completed upon its delivery on July 3, 1989, and the agreement to
receive payment in the future.

The evidence clearly establishes,

that the August 22, 1989 check was intended to cover only the debt
obligation of Eagle Auto Leasing to Warner Nissan which had not
previously been satisfied because Eagle Auto Leasing7s checks were
dishonored. In fact, plaintiff's two witnesses' testimony confirms
and supports that fact. There is absolutely no evidence before the
Trial Court to support a finding that the check "covered the cost
of the vehicle".

That finding should be rejected, and the Court

should find, in accordance with the evidence, that the check was
given to cover the debt of Eagle Auto Leasing to Warner Nissan and
not for the purchase of the car, or as the Trial Court stated "to
cover the cost of the vehicle."
(2)

THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT U.S. CAPITAL PAID FOR THE
COST OF THE 1989 NISSAN SENTRA WITH ITS AUGUST 22, 1989
CHECK.

For the reasons stated above in (1), the August 22, 1989 check
did not relate to the actual purchase of the 1989 Nissan Sentra,
and those funds were not used in the closing of that transaction.
The

check

provided

by U.S. Capital was

part

of

a

separate

transaction related to the retirement of the unpaid debt owed to
Warner Nissan.

The conveyance of the 1989 Nissan Sentra to Eagle
10

Auto Leasing, and its subsequent conveyance to Karen Stoker were
completed more than a month and a half before U.S. Capital became
involved.

U.S. Capital's check did not relate to the securing of

the conveyance of the Nissan Sentra.

U.S. Capital's involvement

related only to resolving the debt obligation created by the
earlier sale of the car by Warner Nissan to Eagle Auto Leasing.
Nothing from the testimony of any party gives any credence to
the finding that "U.S. Capital paid for the cost of the Nissan
Sentra with its check".

The evidence before the Trial Court is

insufficient

its finding and

to support

should . therefore be

rejected.
(3) THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT H U.S. CAPITAL WAS
NEGOTIATING TO ACQUIRE EAGLE AUTO LEASING OR ONE OF ITS
AFFILIATES AND U.S. CAPITAL'S INTEREST IN EAGLE AUTO
LEASING WAS FURTHER CONSIDERATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE
CHECK B5T U.S. CAPITAL".
The Trial Court found that U.S. Capital was negotiating to
acquire Eagle Auto Leasing and the interest U.S. Capital had in
Eagle Auto Leasing was sufficient consideration for the issuance of
the check to Warner Nissan.

The evidence on the record is not

sufficient to support such a finding and thus, it should be
rejected.
Testimony from Warner Nissan's witnesses is equivocal on the
question of the relationship between U.S. Capital and Eagle Auto
Leasing.

That

testimony

is

essentially

based

on

unclear

recollection of conversations with officers of U.S. Capital.
Testimony of U.S. Capital's witnesses, however, is unequivocal and
clear that U.S. Capital was not negotiating to acquire an interest
11

in Eagle Auto Leasing. Confusion with regard to this point appears
to arise out of plaintiff's failure to recognize that another
unrelated entity, VIP*Comlink, was identified as considering the
acquisition of Eagle In-House Services, Inc., a Utah corporation.
Eagle In-House Services, Inc. had a business relationship with
Eagle Auto Leasing but was separate and distinct from Eagle Auto
Leasing. VIP*Comlink is a Utah corporation, separate and distinct
from U.S. Capital, and has never been a party to any of the
transactions in this suit.
For example, in the examination of Douglas R. Johnson, general
manager for Rick Warner Nissan, when asked by plaintiff's counsel
"Did you understand that U.S. Capital would be taking over and
acquiring Eagle Auto Leasing?" his answer was "I wasn't exactly
sure that there was anything that was going to happen there.

I

know that I tried to reach Pat Brody a number of times and he was
over at Mr. Hansen's office before this time so I'm not sure." (R.
159, at p. 15).

In fact, Mr. Johnson candidly admits that with

regard to U.S. Capital's connection with Eagle Auto Leasing that he
"didn't quite catch all at that time.
collecting our funds".

I was more interested in

(R. 159, at p. 13).

Patrick Terrill, assistant sales manager for Warner Nissan,
testified that on or about August 22, he and Mr. Johnson had talked
with Mr. Hansen. Mr. Terrill stated that "Approximately 8-22 Doug
told me in the morning that he had talked to the Capital Financial
people.
added).

I don't know the name."

(R. 159, at p. 50) (emphasis

Mr. Terrill went on to describe the meeting.
12

"Mr. Hansen

did most of the talking, saying that they had acquired Eagle Auto
Leasing and they wanted to continue to do business with us.

He

gave us a check saying — here is the check for the car to pay for
it."

Id.

When

asked

specifically

about

U.S.

Capital's

relationship to Eagle Auto Leasing, Mr. Terrill stated that "they
talked about this VIP leasing program that they had going. I don't
know anything about it and I said well we'll continue to do
business with you and show them good faith to that point."
159, at p. 59).

(R.

On cross-examination, Mr. Terrill stated that

"U.S. Capital had acquired Eagle Auto Leasing," (R. 159, at p. 53),
but could not identify the entity acquiring Eagle Auto Leasing as
anyone other than the person he talked with, Ron Hansen.

(R. 159,

at p. 53).
On plaintiff's direct examination of Ron Hansen, an officer of
U.S. Capital, the relationship between U.S. Capital and Eagle Auto
Leasing was fully explained. Mr. Hansen explained that VIP*Comlink
had at one time looked into acquiring Eagle In-House Services,
Inc., a different corporation than Eagle Auto Leasing.

U.S.

Capital is separate and distinct from VIP*Comlink or any of its
subsidiaries.
and

VTP*Comlink, was not involved in this transaction,

it was VTP*Comlink

that at

some earlier date had been

interested in acquiring Eagle In-House Services, Inc. At no time
did VIP*Comlink or U.S. Capital discuss, negotiate or agree to
acquire Eagle Auto Leasing.
The plaintiff's witnesses concede that they were never sure of
the relationship between U.S. Capital and Eagle Auto Leasing.
13

At

best, they claim they heard there was a relationship, but they
admit that they were only concerned with collecting the money due
from Eagle Auto Leasing regardless of the source.
In short, the record before the Trial Court is devoid of any
clear evidence that U.S. Capital was negotiating to acquire Eagle
Auto Leasing.

The finding by the court that U.S. Capital was

negotiating to acquire Eagle Auto Leasing or one of its affiliates
and U.S. Capital's interest in Eagle Auto Leasing was further
consideration for the issuance of the check to plaintiff by U.S.
Capital is not supported by substantive evidence and should be
rejected.
(4) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT -PLAINTIFF HAS BEEN
DAMAGED BY U.S. CAPITAL CORPORATION'S ISSUANCE OF ITS BAD
CHECK."
There is nothing in the record that would indicate that Warner
Nissan was damaged by U.S. Capital's tender of its check which it
stopped payment on.

The history of the case is clear.

Warner

Nissan delivered the car to Eagle Auto Leasing and accepted two
checks from Eagle Auto Leasing that were later dishonored before
U.S. Capital tendered its check to Warner Nissan at the request of
and as a favor to Eagle Auto Leasing.

Warner Nissan had never

threatened suit, and had not attempted to repossess the automobile,
an action which Warner Nissan concedes it had no right to do
because the car was almost immediately transferred to Karen Stoker.
Warner Nissan did not refrain or forebear from taking any action
because of U.S. Capital's tender of its check, and no new injury
resulted from the stop order.
14

In short, the tender of the check by U.S. Capital did not
create any new damage, new loss or any damage or loss at all to
Warner Nissan. The record is replete with confirmation from Warner
Nissan that they parted with nothing at the time the check was
tendered by U.S. Capital. Where the record is so complete in its
demonstration that no damage was done to Warner Nissan, the court's
finding that plaintiff has been damaged is without substantive
evidence, and clearly erroneous.
B.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS CONCLUSION OF LAW.
The standard of review for conclusions of law entered by the

Trial Court is that the court will accord conclusions of law no
particular deference but review them for correctness.
BMG Corporation, 700 P. 2d 1068 (Utah 1985).

Scharf v.

In this instance, the

Trial Court erred in holding that U.S. Capital is liable to Warner
Nissan under the Dishonored Instruments Statute, U.C.A. §7-15-1,
and

that

adequate

consideration

existed

for Warner

Nissan's

collection of the U.S. Capital check.
(1) U.S. CAPITAL DOES NOT HAVE LIABILITY UNDER THE DISHONORED
INSTRUMENTS STATUTE.
The Dishonored Instruments Statute, §7-15-1, U.C.A. provides
in pertinent part that
Any person who makes, draws, signs, or issues any check,
draft, order or other instrument upon any depository . .
. for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm ,
partnership, or corporation any money, merchandise,
property, or other thing of value or paving for services,
wages, salary, or rent is liable to the holder of the
check if the check . . . is not honored upon presentment
and is marked "refer to maker" . . ., or the account upon
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which the check . . . has been drawn does not exist , has
been closed, or does not have sufficient funds or
sufficient credit for payment in full of the check . . .
. (emphasis added)
In this case, critical to the application of this statute against
U.S. Capital is the check being sued on must be given for one of
the purposes established in the statute.

Section 7-15-1 applies

only where the check is given "for the purpose of obtaining"
"money, merchandise, property, or other like things of value, or
paying for services, wages, salary or rent". In this case there is
no allegation that the August 22, 1989, check was given for any of
those specified purposes.

In fact it is undisputed that U.S.

Capital did not receive anything of value from Warner Nissan in
exchange for the August 22, 1989 check. Thus, where the plaintiff
did not part with anything of value in taking the August 22, 1989,
check from the defendant there is no cause of action against the
defendant under §7-15-1, U.C.A. Because the lower Court improperly
applied the Dishonored

Instruments statute to this case that

determination should be reversed.
(2) WARNER NISSAN CANNOT COLLECT ON THE AUGUST 22, 1989,
CHECK FROM U.S. CAPITAL BECAUSE THERE WAS NO
CONSIDERATION GIVEN.
The lower Court erroneously held that sufficient consideration
was given for U.S. Capital's August 22, 1989, check to permit
Warner Nissan to enforce its collection.

The record is clear,

however, that no consideration was ever given by Warner Nissan or
any other party to U.S. Capital for the benefit given.

Corbin on

Contracts states that "[t]he promise of one person to pay a preexisting debt owed to the promisee by a third person is not
16

enforceable in the absence of a consideration . . .

The third

person's pre-existing debt is not a sufficient 'past consideration'
to support the defendants promise to pay it."
edition)(emphasis added).

Id., at 306 (4th

Corbin goes on to explain

it is beyond question that the debt or obligation of the
principal obligor is not a sufficient basis for the
enforcement of the promise of the surety-or guarantor.
If the promise of the principal and the surety are made
simultaneously, they may be supported by a single
consideration; the loan of money by the creditor to the
principal is a sufficient consideration for the promise
of both principal and surety. But for the promise of any
surety that is made subsequently to the advance of money
to the principal, there must be new consideration. The
fact that the loan has been made and the principal is
indebted is not a sufficient reason for enforcement of
the surety's subsequent promise.
Id. (footnotes omitted)(emphasis added)
In this case, it is undisputed that the debt which arose
between Eagle Auto Leasing and Warner Nissan was supported by
consideration given by Warner Nissan in the form of the car
conveyed.

U.S. Capital, however, was not a party

transaction.

to that

Two months later when U.S. Capital .presented its

check to Warner Nissan, no new consideration was given for its
involvement. The pre-existing obligation between Warner Nissan and
Eagle Auto Leasing, which included the conveyance of the car, is
insufficient as a matter of law to serve as consideration for U.S.
Capital's tender of its check.
The record is devoid of any evidence that consideration was
given for U.S. Capital's check. The lower Court erroneously found
that consideration for the check existed because U.S. Capital was
acquiring

Eagle

Auto

Leasing.
17

Whether

that

is

sufficient

consideration, is both unclear and irrelevant because U.S. Capital
was not acquiring Eagle Auto Leasing and had never considered it.
No other real or imagined benefit, by way of money, property or
even forbearance to purse legal remedies, was given for U.S.
Capital's check to Warner Nissan.
If the debt created by the sale of the vehicle to Eagle Auto
Leasing is viewed as consideration to support Warner Nissan's claim
on U.S. Capital's check, it would mean that U.S. Capital's issuance
of its check resulted in its assumption of the Eagle Auto Leasing
debt.

As assumption of the debt of another, to be enforceable,

must meet the Utah Statute of Frauds, §25-5-1 et seq. or it is
void.

Section 25-5-4(2)provides that "every promise to answer for

the debt . . . of another" is void "unless the agreement or some
note or memorandum of the agreement is in writing signed by the
party to be charged with the agreement."

Furthermore, Utah law

requires that any note or memorandum relied upon to satisfy the
Statute

of

Frauds must

contain all the essential

terms and

provisions of the assumption agreement. Birdzell v. Utah Oil Ref.,
Co., 242 P.2d 578 (1952).

No evidence of any memorandum was ever

presented by Warner Nissan, and the evidence is clear that U.S.
Capital never intended to assume or become responsible for Eagle
Auto Leasing's debt.
Finally, the lower Court held that Warner Nissan was holder in
due course of the U.S. Capital check. That holding has no bearing
on this case and does not preclude any of U.S. Capital's defenses
to collection of the check.

Section 70A-3-305(2), states that "a
18

holder in due course takes the instrument free from . . . all
defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has
not dealt . . ."(emphasis added).

In a suit against a party with

whom the holder in due course has dealt, the defendant can plead
all defenses to the collection of the check including lack of
consideration.
305:03.

Hankland, Uniform Commercial Code, §§3-302:04, 3-

Therefore, regardless of Warner Nissan's status as a

holder in due course, there is no bar to U.S. Capital's defenses
including the defense of lack or want of consideration.
The lower Court's ruling that there is adequate consideration
for the enforcement of a claim for $10,043.00 against U.S. Capital
is without basis and should be reversed.

The record fails to

demonstrate any consideration flowing to any party because of the
tender of the August 22, 1989 check by U.S. Capital.

In addition,

the record is clear that Warner Nissan suffered no detriment, gave
nothing of value, and did not forebear or relinquish any right by
the acceptance of the check. Where it is so abundantly clear that
no consideration existed for the tender of the check, Warner Nissan
has no claim to enforce the collection of the check against U.S.
Capital.
CONCLUSION
The lower Court clearly erred in making Findings of Fact that
the August 22, 1989 check of U.S. Capital was given to "cover the
cost of the vehicle," and that U.S. Capital "paid for the cost of
the 1989 Nissan Sentra with its check."
support those findings

There is no evidence to

If anything, those findings arose out of
19

the lower Court's failure to understand that the sale of the
vehicle which had been completed nearly two months earlier, was not
contingent upon or related to the delivery of the August 22, 1989
check.
In addition, the lower Court clearly erred in finding that
consideration existed for the tender of the U.S. Capital check.
Nothing of value passed from Warner Nissan or any other party to
U.S. Capital in consideration for the check.

Finally, the lower

Court erred in finding that Warner Nissan had been damaged by U.S.
Capital's issuance of its bad check.

There is no evidence to

support this finding, and in fact, the clear weight of the evidence
establishes that Warner Nissan parted with nothing in accepting
U.S. Capital's check, including any right to pursue any claim
against Eagle Auto Leasing. Because there is insufficient evidence
to support the Court's Findings of Fact, those Findings of Fact
should be rejected, and this case should be remanded to the lower
Court with directions that Findings of Facts be entered which are
consistent with the clear weight of the evidence.
The lower Court erred in its application of law by applying
§7-15-1 of the U.C.A., and in holding that sufficient consideration
existed for the enforcement of collection of a $10,043.00 debt from
U.S.

Capital.

instrument

is

Specifically,
given

for

§7-15-1

the

purpose

applies
of

only

obtaining

when

an

money,

merchandise, property or other thing of value or paying for
services, wages, salary or rent. The check given in this instance
was given for none of those purposes, and nothing of value was
20

received in exchange for that check that meets the requirements of
§7-15-1.

Where the requirements of §7-15-1 have clearly not been

met, the lower Court erred in applying that statute to this case.
Similarly,

the

record

before

the

Court

is

clear

that

no

consideration was given for the issuance of U.S. Capital's check.
Where there is a lack of consideration for an obligation, that
obligation cannot be enforced.
Because the Court has erred in its application of both the
Dishonored Instruments Statute, and in holding that consideration
existed

for

determinations

the

issuance

of

U.S.

Capital's

should be reversed, and

check,

the matter

those

should be

remanded to the lower Court with direction that judgment be entered
in favor of U.S. Capital.
DATED this /<£ftf

day of April, 1991.
STOKER & THOMAS
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day of

April, 1991, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
J. Angus Edwards
Purser, Okasaki & Berrett
39 Post Office Place, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

WARNER IMPORTS, INC.,
dba RICK WARNER NISSAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.

Trial Court No. 890906750 CV

U.S. CAPITAL CORPORATION, a
dissolved Utah corporation,
and EAGLE AUTO LEASING,
a Utah corporation,

Supreme Court No. 900480

Defendants-Appellants.
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On Appeal from the Judgment of the Third District Court
In and For Salt Lake CountyHonorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge

Stephen G. Stoker #3122
David B. Thomas #3228
STOKER & THOMAS
311 South State Street, #400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant

J. Angus Edwards
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT
39 Post Office Place
Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellee
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J. Angus Edwards, 4563
PURSER, OKAZAKI & BERRETT
A Professional Corporation
39 Post Office Place
Third Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-3555
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THIRD JUDICIAL COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

WARNER IMPORTS, INC.,
dba RICK WARNER NISSAN,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.
U.S. CAPITAL CORPORATION,
a dissolved corporation,
and EAGLE AUTO LEASING,
a Utah corporation,

Civil No. 890906750CN
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

Defendants.

This case having come on for trial before the above-entitled
Court on the 16th day of July 1990 upon the plaintiff's Complaint,
the Answer of defendant, U.S. Capital Corp., and the other
pleadings and documents on file, the plaintiff being represented
by J. Angus Edwards of Purser, Okazaki & Berrett, defendant,

U.S. Capital, being represented by Stephen G. Stoker of Stoker &
Thomas and defendant, Eagle Auto Leasing Corp., not appearing in
person or by counsel.

The Court having heard and considered the

evidence adduced at trial, the documents in the file and the
arguments of counsel, the Court hereby makes the following findings
of fact and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff is a Utah corporation with its principal place

of business in Salt Lake County, Utah.
2.

U.S. Capital Corp. is a dissolved Utah corporation.

3.

The matter in controversy exceeds the sura of $10,000.

4.

Plaintiff is a full service Nissan automobile dealership.

5.

Plaintiff sold a 1989 Nissan Sentra to defendant, Eagle

Auto Leasing, for the use and benefit of Karen Stoker.
6.

Defendant, Eagle Auto Leasing, issued a check dated July

3, 1989 in the sum of $10,043.50 and a check dated July 27, 1989
in the amount of $10,143.50 payable to plaintiff for the purchase
of the 1989 Nissan Sentra on behalf of plaintiff, but both checks
were dishonored for insufficient funds.
7.

Defendant, U.S. Capital Corp., signed and issued a

check made payable to plaintiff dated August 22, 1989 in

A03385.jae
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the sum of $10,143,50 to cover the cost of the vehicle, service
charges and the problems with the prior bad checks.
8. Plaintiff received two checks from Eagle and Auto Leasing
and a third check from U.S. Capital and delivered them to its bank
for payment.
9. Consideration for issuance of the check by defendant, U.S.
Capital Corp., included the giving of the third check for the two
prior bad checks.
10.

Eagle Auto Leasing, promised to pay or reimburse U.S.

Capital for the $10,143.50 payment by check from U.S. Capital to
plaintiff.
11.

Plaintiff refused to accept any additional checks from

Eagle Auto Leasing and, therefore, U.S. Capital paid for the cost
of 1989 Nissan Sentra with its check as a direct result of
plaintiff's refusal to receive further checks from Eagle Auto
Leasing.
12. U.S. Capital Corp. was negotiating to acquire Eagle Auto
Leasing or one of its affiliates and U.S. Capital Corp.'s interest
in Eagle Auto Leasing was further consideration for the issuance
of the check to plaintiff by U.S. Capital.

A03385.jae
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13. U.S. Capital issued a stop payment order only after Eagle
Auto Leasing failed to deliver its reimbursement check to U.S.
Capital.
14.

The testimony by defendant was that the check from U.S.

Capital Corp. was issued as a favor or gift to Pat Brody.
15.

Defendant received timely and effective notice from

plaintiff that defendant's check had been dishonored by certified
letter dated October 17, 1989.
16.

Plaintiff has been damaged by U.S. Capital Corp.'s

issuance of its bad check in the amount of the check of $10,143.50,
including service charges of $30.00, and a service charge on the
check from U.S. Capital in the sum of $15.00 for a total principal
amount of $10,158.50, plus pre-judgment interest at the lawful
rate.
17.

Plaintiff is entitled to all costs and reasonable

attorney's

fees

pursuant

to

§

7-15-1,

of the amount of fees and costs ±s
the matter

is scheduled

and

heard

but

determination

expressly reserved
before

the

until

above-entitled

Court.
18.

Plaintiff was an innocent party and had no knowledge or

warning that the check from U.S. Capital might be dishonored or was
contingent on payment from Eagle Auto Leasing.

A03385.jae
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The jurisdiction and venue of this Court is proper,

2.

Default Judgment shall be entered only against defendant,

Eagle Auto Leasing, for its failure to answer or otherwise appear.
3. Adequate consideration was given by plaintiff in exchange
for the check from defendant, U.S. Capital Corp.
4.

U.S. Capital Corp.'s check was dishonored within the

meaning of § 7-15-1.
5.

Alternatively, plaintiff is deemed to be a holder in due

course.
6.

Defendant received timely and effective notice from

plaintiff that its check had been dishonored by certified mail
dated October 17, 1989.
7.

Defendant is liable for the amount of its dishonored

check in the sum of $10,143.50, a service charge of $15.00,
pre-judgment interest at the lawful rate, all plaintiff's costs
and reasonable attorney's fees to be determined at a subsequent
hearing•

A03385.jae
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LET JUDGMENT 3E ENTERED ACCORDINGLY
DATED this

JT

day of

, 1990
BY THE COURT:

onorable Homer F. Wilkinson
Third Judicial District Court Judge
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